The Battle-Part II

s the campaigns of Fall 1944 developed, it became clear to Hitler and his close advisors that there was a weak area in the Allied front. It lay between the Aachen salient in the north and the American forces closing in on the Saar to the south. The weakest point in the lines was in the 80-mile front along the Ardennes. This was an area with which the Germans were very familiar, having occupied it up until recently, and having also mounted a major offensive through it in 1940. Presently it was used by both Allied and German armies to rest units or to get green units “blooded.”

The plan was relatively simple: catch the Allies basking in the over confidence of their successes (Montgomery’s gamble in Holland notwithstanding), penetrate their thinnest lines at a time when weather would ground their air forces, race to the Meuse river by the second day, and northwest from there directly to Antwerp, recapture that vital port, and seal off a large portion of the Allied force. The success of the offensive depended on hitting hard and fast, and achieving its objectives before the stunned Allies could respond. On 25 September, Jodl was ordered to prepare the plan of attack. By 12 October, Jodl had submitted the plan and Hitler had made his revisions.

The attack would be spearheaded by the 12 available Panzer divisions, which were to ignore any pockets of resistance and get to the Meuse as quickly as possible. The northern and southern flanks of this panzer advance would be protected from the Allied army forces by supporting troops and artillery, and all organized areas of resistance would be the responsibility of the infantry units that followed immediately behind.

Hitler made the decision to notify his battle commanders only as the need arose. Secrecy was paramount. Not only would the offensive be jeopardized if the Allies obtained advance information, it was also uncertain in Hilter’s mind whom he could trust in his own military. The operation was code named WACHT AM RHEIN: “Watch on the Rhine.” Jump-off was set for 25 November.

This defensive-sounding operational name was bandied about in intentionally sloppy German communiqués that were then intercepted by Allied intelligence, and played directly to the psychology of the over-confident Allied high command. Critical German messages pertaining to the buildup were not transmitted by radio, thus Allied cryptographers were without Enigma warnings. And, because this German buildup was taking place in German territory, the reports from the underground that had been so vital in France and Holland, were now unavailable.

German commanders knew that the Western Allied leaders fully expected a counter-attack as the Allies approached the German border. Many units massing for the Ardennes offensive were thus used to help foster speculation and planning in this regard. During the WACHT AM RHEIN buildup, panzer divisions were put in plain sight east of the Rhine River, but were then readied for quick movement to the Ardennes. Troop movements into the Ardennes took place at night.

Model, who took over planning from Jodl, agreed with von Rundstedt—whom Hitler largely ignored now—that Antwerp, or even the Meuse, was an unrealistic objective. They proposed an alternative: attack northward into the Aachen salient and hit the soft spot where the American and British forces joined. Then, with another force, proceed through the Ardennes, turn north before the Meuse into a second pincer, and destroy the Allied forces caught in the middle. This alternative, which the German generals referred to as “the little solution,” was rejected by Hitler.

Hitler’s attacking forces were to be led by SS Gen. Sepp Dietrich, a fanatical Nazi and former Hitler bodyguard, whom von Rundstedt referred to simply as “stupid.” Dietrich’s 6th Panzer Army, by then the beneficiary of many new tanks diverted from shipment to the Eastern Front, would be spearheaded by SS Col. Joachim Peiper’s 1 SS Panzer Division, whose job it was to blaze the trail to Antwerp. In the middle would be Gen. Hasso von Manteuffel, who was to lead the 5th Panzer Army. After crossing the Meuse, von Manteuffel’s army was to push on to Brussels. To the south, protecting the left flank of 5th Panzer in the initial assault, would be four infantry divisions of the German 7th Army.

By November, however, Allied leaders were convinced that German forces were diminishing rapidly. Eisenhower’s intelligence told him that this process now netted about five less German divisions on the line each month. The British were also beginning to run out of men, but American troops continued to pour in. By the beginning of the November Allied offensive toward the Roer, there were 63 Allied divisions in Europe, of which 41 were American. The Germans still had at least 70 divisions in the west (Merriam, 72).

The Ardennes, referred to by soldiers as the “Ghost Front,” was a hilly, heavily-forested region with few roads. By November, the snow was often waist deep in places.

From the end of October through 25 November, an average of 33 German troop and supply trains moved into the Ardennes each day. By December, these had increased to 100 per day. Approximately 250,000 men had to be positioned, along with their equipment and a substantial number of vehicles. Though the trains moved at night, hiding in tunnels and in the forests by day, there were still numerous reports of this build-up. An Allied offensive was considered for the end of November to trap what intelligence now considered to total approximately 21 German divisions. Planning was abandoned for a variety of reasons, however, not the least of which was the Allied conviction that the Germans could be trapped later when they moved out, as Hitler would surely not choose to “dissipate [his] remaining forces on an attack over so difficult a terrain as that in the Ardennes” (Merriam, 59, 73).

With the approach of 25 November, it was clear in the German high command that not all the details of the Ardennes offensive had been worked out, so the jump-off date was postponed until mid-December. This caused no special problems for the Germans, however, as bad weather that the Germans hoped would limit Allied reconnaissance was expected to continue. Moreover, the German war machine seldom ran on time anymore.

On 2 December, Field Marshal Model made a final appeal to Hitler to adopt the alternative “little solution” that he and von Rundstedt had proposed. Hitler rejected it again. Von Rundstedt did not bother to attend the meeting.

By the first week of December, the U.S. Ninth Army and much of the northern branch of the First Army, the VII Corps, were occupying a twenty-mile stretch along the west bank of the Roer River. The Allies had realized somewhat belatedly that no crossing of the Roer could be made without destroying or controlling the earthen dams upriver. Bombers had been tried, but with little effect. The middle branch of the First Army, the V Corps, was assigned the task of taking the dams. To the south, Gen. Troy Middleton’s VIII Corps covered the 80-mile front of the Ardennes sector. Of the four infantry divisions stationed there, two were understrength and recuperating from heavy fighting in the push to the Ruhr, and two were green, having just arrived.

In spite of the defeat at Arnhem and the bitter, costly fighting during the Fall, the optimism resulting from the chase across France was still interfering with the reasoning process of many Allied commanders.

“The intelligence officers of all commands,” wrote one military historian, “seemed to enter into a deliberate contest in those fateful days to see who could make most fun of the critical German situation” (Merriam, 70).

Eisenhower’s intelligence chief, Gen. Kenneth Strong, believed that the Germans were still using the Ardennes to supply troops to the “battle sectors,” which were defensive positions between the advancing Allies and the Rhine River. As late as 14 December, Strong’s maps only showed four German divisions facing Middleton’s VIII Corps. The VIII Corps, which had been in the Ardennes for three months now, had yet to take any major defensive precautions.

Middleton’s intelligence officer, on 9 December 1944, concluded that the German’s “present practice of bringing new divisions to this sector to receive front-line experience, and then relieving them out for commitment elsewhere, indicates his desire to have this sector of the front remain quiet and inactive.”

During this time there were increasing reports of troop movements. Panzer divisions disappeared. The 6th Panzer Army was still conspicuously guarding the Rhine (the Germans did not plan to move it until the last few nights, hoping for bad weather and no daylight Allied reconnaissance). Numerous German prisoners of war were captured and all seemed to have much higher morale than usual. Some even talked about the upcoming offensive. Nearby civilians also reported a buildup. Reconnaissance flights noted weaponry and equipment suggesting “offensive rather than defensive action.”

First Army intelligence officer Col. Benjamin A. Dickson came closest to predicting the attack. He believed the Germans capable of mounting a substantial armored counterattack, but predicted it would be on the Aachen salient and in defense of the region between the Roer and the Rhine. Like a few others, Dickson anticipated the possibility of a logical counterattack very similar to the “little solution” proposed to Hitler by von Rundstedt and Model.

On 12 December, the day that German unit commanders were receiving their final briefings, Bradley’s Twelfth Army Group Intelligence issued this statement: “It is now certain that attrition is steadily sapping the strength of German forces on the Western Front and that the crust of defenses is thinner, more brittle, and more vulnerable than it appears on our G-2 maps or to the troops in the line.”

On 13 December three infantry divisions of the First Army’s V Corps began their push across the northern edge of the Ardennes toward the earthen dams of the Roer River. Eisenhower sent a letter to Montgomery detailing the irreparable damage done to the German war machine by the recent Allied offensive.

On 14 December, two captured German soldiers reported that they had been called back from rest positions to their divisions on 11 December, because the German army was preparing to attack. Intelligence officers in VIII Corps quickly rewrote the report to read that the German soldiers had been called back because “the Americans were getting ready to attack.” They concluded that it must have been an error by translators. “It’s obvious,” said the intelligence officers, “they [the Germans] couldn’t be preparing an attack.”

On 15 December, Col. Dickson made this suggestion: “Although the enemy is resorting to his attack propaganda to bolster morale of the troops, it is possible that a limited-scale offensive will be launched for the purpose of achieving a Christmas morale ‘victory’ for civilian consumption” (Merriam, 63f).

See next, The Ardennes, Part III: The Battle Begins.