History's Largest Airborne Assault

Airborne planners began work immediately after approval, on 10 September, with no time to spare. Since the inception of the combined command six weeks previous, the First Allied Airborne Army—which was supposed to streamline planning and implementation of operations—had planned and canceled eighteen operations. It seemed everybody wanted an airborne mission, or emergency resupply.

Army commanders in need of fuel believed that their needs were paramount and got commitments from Eisenhower and General Paul L. Williams to respond. In the weeks prior to MARKET, “ . . .the transports were flying an average of six hundred tons of supplies, chiefly fuel, up to the forward units every day during the time that these airborne operations were planned and rejected.” In just the four days before D-Day for MARKET, “IX Troop Carrier Command flew 1,901 sorties, delivering 5,358 tons of supplies forward and carrying 1,891 wounded men to the rear” (Galvin, 173).

A frustrated Brereton wrote in his diary, 7 September 1944: “The Troop Carriers will be used either to supply the ground forces or for their proper mission of delivering airborne troops. They cannot do both.

“I feel that, inasmuch as the Airborne Army is a strategic general headquarters reserve, the planning should be held on the Supreme Commander’s level. When the planning is below Army Group level, it represents time wasted, because in practically every case the operation is not feasible. . . . The conception of the employment of the Airborne Army as a strategic army is not understood” (Brereton, 339). Troop Carrier commanders agreed with Brereton’s assessment. See photo.

According to USAF official historical documents, “MARKET is unique as the only large American airborne operation during World War II for which there was no training program, no rehearsal, almost no exercises, and a generally low level of tactical training activity.” Resupply, evacuation, and related efforts were the primary commitments for IX TCC aircraft and crews, with bad weather a common factor. In addition to these efforts, came the expectation of missions, as mentioned above, including alerts for these missions. In fact, “from 12 August until 17 September, there were only five days on which FAAA did not believe that an airborne operation was just around the corner. This belief made training plans seem superfluous and realistic exercises a rash commitment” (Warren-97, 99).

MARKET, a corps-size drop, would be the largest airborne assault in history, and would place airborne troops up to 60 miles behind enemy lines. To supply airborne troops so far removed, numerous missions would be required. Planners, who assumed a three-day stretch of good weather, spread the resupply missions over a three-day period. British and American staff made up the weather officers of the FAAA and coordinated closely with senior meteorologists throughout the British Isles. They were well aware that weather in the North Sea area was notoriously hard to predict in mid-September.