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According to specific plans, the
U.S. 101st Airborne would be responsible for securing the roadway and
bridges from Eindhoven north for 15½ miles. Bridges included four over
the upper Dommel at Eindhoven, one at Zon over the Wilhelmina Canal, one
over the Dommel at St. Oedenrode, and four over the Aa River and the
Willems Canal at Veghel.
The U.S. 82nd Airborne was
responsible for taking and holding the bridge over the Maas near Grave,
at least one of four bridges over the Maas-Waal Canal between Grave and
Nijmegen and the bridge over the Waal, which is the southern branch of
the Rhine, at Nijmegen. In addition, the 82nd had to take the only high
ground in the area, the Groesbeek Heights, a 300-ft. ridge which
commanded the surrounding countryside. Nijmegen, a city of about 82,000
people, was heavily fortified and thought likely to contain a large
garrison of German troops.
The British 1 Airborne Division was
assigned the bridge over the Neder Rijn (the northern branch of the
Rhine) at Arnhem, and was then to establish a bridgehead at Arnhem. It
was to be reinforced later by the Polish 1st Parachute Brigade.
The British XXX Corps, comprising a
vanguard of the 43d Wessex, the 50th Northumberland, and the Guards
Armored Divisions would push up through Valkenwaard to Eindhoven,
through Veghel, Uden, Grave, Nijmegen and into Arnhem, some 60 miles in
all. The stretch between Eindhoven and Grave was all bottomland,
networked with drainage ditches, and a much better place for defenders
than long, slow-moving motorized columns. The entire route, from below
Eindhoven to Arnhem, was essentially confined to one narrow roadway. See
Battle Area map.
Airborne commanders picked their
own drop zones. Both Gen. Maxwell Taylor (101st) and Gen. James Gavin
(82nd) picked drop and landing zones in the immediate vicinity of their
early objectives. Gen. Robert E. Urquhart, recently named commander of
the British 1 Airborne, picked an area 7-8 miles away from the Arnhem
bridge. Urquhart, a proven and effective infantry commander, had no
airborne experience, and based on information received from RAF, picked
a site distant from what were known to be concentrations of flak
batteries. The ground near the bridge was also known to be marshy.
However, the trade-off, which was to prove very costly, was that
Urquhart’s men would not only lose the element of surprise, but
because they were going to receive reinforcements on subsequent days,
would have to leave a substantial part of their force in place to hold
the drop and landing areas.
Dutch Underground reports,
confirmed by photos provided through Allied intelligence and by decoded Enigma
transmissions, indicated the presence of two panzer divisions in Arnhem.
These divisions, part of the II SS Panzer Corps, had been sent only
recently to Arnhem by Field Marshal Walter Model. They were there for
refitting, getting ready for possible use in the upcoming German
offensive in the Ardennes. Although the 82nd seems to have accepted these
reports as valid, British intelligence dismissed them as incredible
(Warren-97, 115). Montgomery believed that these divisions were not
capable of any meaningful action, and did not notify his XXX Corps
commander, Gen. Brian G. Horrocks, of their presence. Also not informed
was Gen. Urquhart, commander of the British 1 Airborne division, soon to
land in the location where the panzer divisions had been spotted.
Gen. F.A.M. Browning, designated airborne commander, who was to
be flown with his headquarters staff in gliders to the area occupied by
the American 82nd Airborne, was shown photographs of the panzer tanks in
Arnhem. He, like Montgomery, felt they would not be ready for action
(Dank, a, 206). Browning,
however, had his misgivings.
When he asked Montgomery how long
the British 1 Airborne would have to hold at Arnhem before the XXX Corps
arrived, Montgomery assured him no more than two days. “We can hold it
for four,” Browning told him. “But I think we might be going a
bridge too far” (Bauer, 1816).
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