On the eve of MARKET IX Troop Carrier Command had 1,274 C-47s and 1,284 combat crews to fly them. Available gliders (CG-4As) totaled 2,160 (of which about 90 percent were to be used), and 2,060 glider pilots. Glider pilots, with very few exceptions, would fly this mission without co-pilots.

The British had 321 converted bombers in 38 Group, and 164 Dakotas in 46 Group. In addition, there were 812 Horsas and 64 Hamilcars available.

IX TCC still had no armor or self-sealing fuel tanks on its C-47s, though in late June, Robert A. Lovett, Assistant Secretary of War for Air, had made the trip over and promised to rectify this. Only about 400 Wacos had a reinforced nose of either the Griswold or Corey types, though these had been ordered in January, 1944. About 900 gliders had parachute arrestors installed.          

Though the 52d and 53d Wings were still at their English bases, groups of the 50th Wing had been ordered on 8 September to move to France, near Reims, where they were to operate air supply to Patton’s nearby Third Army. By 10 September the air echelons of the 439th (in Juvincourt) and the 441st were already operating there. Orders were soon given to get back to England; an airborne assault mission was imminent. Balderton (439th), Fulbeck (440th) and Langar (441st) were all in the process of being turned back to the British, so strenuous efforts had to be made by supply and engineering officers and men of the Wing to get the fields ready for immediate troop carrier operations. Most of 50th Wing’s equipment and all its refueling units were either in France or on the way, and thus had to be borrowed from 52d Wing.

Briefings of wing and group commanders were held on 15 September, D-minus-2. Group commanders, upon return to their stations, briefed squadron commanders and essential squadron staff members, who in turn prepared the detailed briefing for all combat crews. Briefings of combat crews were held at unit stations on D-minus-1.

Troop Carrier commanders had established two routes, Northern and Southern, to the Drop and Landing Zones (see Route Map). The purpose of this was “to provide greater security and to improve the flexibility in the execution of the entire plan [in case one route became impassable]” (IX TCC, a, 10). The Northern route would traverse about 80 miles of enemy territory, and would be used on D-Day for bringing in the 82nd Airborne to its objectives around Nijmegen, and the British 1 Airborne into the area outside of Arnhem. The Southern route, which was largely over friendly territory except for a direct passage over the front lines, would ideally be used to bring in the 101st Airborne to its zones just beyond Eindhoven. In addition, Troop Carrier commanders had designed a system for MARKET by which formations could be concentrated to a much greater degree than had been possible on the night flights of the NEPTUNE and DRAGOON missions. Three parallel lanes, 1½-miles apart, were established side by side for each route: the left column to Arnhem, the center to Nijmegen and the right to Eindhoven. British 38 and 46 Groups’ aircraft that were towing gliders were assigned a fourth lane, 1,000 feet above the left column. The plan for MARKET did not call for simultaneous use of all four lanes on any route, as the Southern route was more suitable for the Eindhoven missions, but all four could be used on either route if circumstances dictated.

Further concentration was accomplished by spacing the serials of aircraft closer together: nine-ship Vs of Vs in trail for parachute columns, with four-minute intervals between serial lead aircraft; pairs of pairs echeloned to the right for glider tugs, with seven-minute intervals between lead aircraft (this compared with six- and ten-minute intervals, respectively, in Normandy). With the combination of multiple lanes and closer intervals, “1,055 plane loads of paratroops and 478 gliders could be delivered in the initial lift within 65 minutes, the same time it took to bring in 369 sticks in NEPTUNE” (Warren-97, 90).

According to the historical account of Operation MARKET written by Headquarters, IX Troop Carrier Command, 2 January 1945, safety considerations also played a role in this design: “In developing the formation column, much consideration was given to keeping the column-time length at a minimum to insure maximum benefit from fighter escort and permit the shortest time for operation over enemy territory” (IX TCC, a, 15).

On 16 September, at 1630, the weather officers of FAAA reported a favorable forecast for the next four days. Gen. Brereton gave the order to proceed with the mission.