|
1918:
Isolated French
raids in WW I during which two-man demolition teams parachuted behind
German lines to destroy communications.
1918, July-October:
Small-scale Allied airborne resupply during the Mihiel and
Meuse-Argonne campaigns.
1928: Italian pilots dropped supplies
by parachute to the dirigible Italia, stranded at the North
Pole.
1929-30: Italian paratroopers made
mass jumps in North Africa.
1931: The U.S. Army Air Corps flew a
field artillery battery complete with equipment to Panama as a
demonstration of “hemispheric defense.” Two years later, in keeping with
U.S. tacticians’ preference for airlanding rather than parachute delivery
during this period, the maneuver was repeated in Panama, but with a full
battalion. Then, in maneuvers near Fort DuPont, Delaware, AAC Capt. George
C. Kenney “astounded his colleagues” by airlanding an infantry detachment
behind “enemy” lines.
1933, 18 August:
Soviet demonstration,
Moscow; 46 paratroops jumped from two large bombers, and also dropped a
small combat tank by parachute.
1935, 1 March: During Soviet airborne
maneuvers at Kiev, two battalions of infantry were dropped; three
18-passenger gliders were also landed on these maneuvers. Gliders had
been towed 1,170 miles—in triple-tow. All pilots involved were women.
1936, September-October:
Soviet mass drop of 1,200 paratroops
at Minsk, while 5,200 paratroops
jumped in maneuvers at Moscow.
1938, 7 October:
Germans airlanded a
complete infantry regiment of 2,800 men in a wheat field near Freiwaldau,
Silesia.
1940, 9 April: The first combat
airborne assaults of the war. A regiment of German paratroops from General
Kurt Student’s 7th Parachute Division, with air support, staged
coordinated surprise assaults on airfields in key locations in Norway, and
to a lesser extent, Denmark, followed by massive airlanding of troops and
supplies and subsequent small-scale airborne operations. For these
operations the Luftwaffe used the JU-52, the primary German troop carrier
aircraft of WW II. This airplane had a length of 62 ft. and a wingspan of
almost 96 ft. Its weight empty ranged
between models from 12,610 lbs to 14,330 lbs; maximum loaded weight varied from 23,148 lbs to 24,250
lbs. It could generally carry into combat 18 equipped troopers or a maximum load of
4,409 lbs. The JU-52 was a tri-motor aircraft (one engine in the nose
and two on the wings), with a corrugated metal skin. It’s engines were
9-cylinder BMW radials that generated between 725-850 hp depending on
models. (The C-47’s P&W Twin Wasps, by comparison, were 1,200 hp
14-cylinder radials). The JU-52 had a top speed of 168 mph at sea level,
and a standard range of 684 miles. It had no self-sealing tanks or armor
plating, though it regularly carried an assortment of machine guns that
were manually aimed, and sometimes had a cockpit roof cupola or a dorsal
turret equipped with a 20mm machine gun.
1940, 10 May: Part of a reinforced
company of Student’s forces staged the first glider assault of the war
against the massive Belgian fortress, Eben Emael, 20 airline miles north
of Liège on the west side of the Albert Canal. Included in the attack
were also three key
bridges over the same canal. JU-52s and Stuka dive bombers were used to tow
approximately 50 gliders into the area for the highly-successful assault.
The attack was staged at night on a small landing zone, with no advance artillery or
aerial bombardment. (The glider used was the standard Luftwaffe combat
glider of WW II, the DFS-230, which had been perfected in the days before
the war as the Germans trained many Luftwaffe pilots under the auspices of
a civilian sport glider program. The DFS-230 was a high-wing,
fabric-covered craft constructed of tubular steel. Like the CG-4A, the
German glider was equipped with spoilers, and made considerable use of
stressed plywood in the wing construction. Unlike the CG-4A, the Luftwaffe
glider had a machine gun mounted on top of the fuselage, immediately
behind the pilot. The DFS-230 seated nine soldiers who sat single-file
behind the pilot and could carry a maximum load of 2,800 lbs. It had a
length of 37½ ft. and wingspan of 72 ft.) The same day that the glider
raid on Eben Emael took place, the Luftwaffe used approximately 500
JU-52s to deliver five parachute regiments plus one airlanded infantry
division. Objectives included key airfields in Holland and nearby bridges
over the Maas, Waal, and Lower Rhine rivers in advance of invading German
forces.
1940, 29-30 June: In the first combat
use of Soviet airborne forces in an air assault, two airborne brigades
parachuted from TB-3 bombers into Rumanian Bessarabia and captured the
cities of Bolgrad, Kagul, and Izmail.
1941, 10 February: In the first British
airborne action of the war, 38 commandos parachuted from Whitley bombers
to locations high on Monte Volturno in an effort to disrupt the supply of
water through the Tragino aqueduct to several Italian towns, including
Taranto and Foggia. The result was temporary damage to the aqueduct and
eventual capture of all commandos.
1941, 26 April: 1,500 German parachutists and
gliderborne troops, transported by
approximately 50 JU-52s and 12 gliders, temporarily seized the bridge over the Corinth Canal in
Greece, a bottleneck in both the British escape route and the German
advance. However, the bridge was soon destroyed, evidently by Australian
or British soldiers who had prepared it for demolition.
1941, 20 May: German airborne
assault, divisional in size, of the island of Crete, using both parachute
and glider delivery. Air operations included ten Luftwaffe groups of
JU-52s, plus hundreds of support aircraft. The plan was similar to that
used in Norway and Holland: capture three key airfields on the island,
then land ground troops by air and/or sea to consolidate positions. Poor
planning by General Student, however, including dispersal of his troops
and inefficient use of troop carrier aircraft, was
superseded only by the mistakes and shortages of the defending Allied
units. The result was a Cadmean victory for the Germans who captured Crete
at the cost of 5,140 casualties (almost 4,000 of them killed), 170 of the
Luftwaffe’s 600 JU-52s, and an utterance by Hitler that “the days of the
paratroopers are over.”
1941, July-October:
Soviet
parachute raids on a small scale near Kiev, in the area near the Black
Sea, and on the northwestern edge of the Caucasus.
1942, 3 January-6 March:
Airborne troops of
the Soviet IV Airborne Corps, totaling approximately 14,000 men, were
dropped or airlanded into the rear area of the German forces attacking
Moscow in the vicinity of Vyaz’ma, 130 SW of Moscow. The operations
included six major drops that were often spread out over several days due
mainly to shortages in troop carrier aircraft (including PS-84s, TB-3s,
and probably even some Soviet-built C-47s). Initial objectives generally
required troopers to secure—and in one instance,
establish—an airfield
for airlanding additional forces. The troopers of IV Airborne Corps were
to link up with attacking Soviet ground forces and, along with partisans
in the vicinity, cut German supply lines and strike a counterblow; in the
drop of 6 March, parachutists jumped even farther west and directly
attacked the supply base at Elnya. The overall effort suffered from poor
coordination between units, bad weather, shortages, ineffective resupply,
pilots who were poorly trained in night navigation and formation flying,
and scattered drops; however, the effort threw off the German timetable in
Hitler’s quest for Moscow. Troopers were isolated and eventually defeated
in a battle during which some units fought in the line for four months,
making this the longest-running airborne operation in history.
Approximately 4,000 men survived.
1942, 11 January-23
February: The first
airborne assault missions by the Japanese. A reinforced battalion, the
Yokosuka Special Naval Landing Force, seized an airfield from Dutch forces
near Manado in the Celebes on 11 January as an amphibious force landed
nearby. Troop carrier aircraft used were the Mitsubishi Ki-57, an airplane
that resembled the DC-3, though smaller, and a few of the similarly-sized
Kawasaki Ki-56s (Japanese-built Lockheed Lodestars). The field was used by
Japanese aircraft to extend the range of protection provided to their navy
as the Emperor’s forces pushed through Indonesia. On 14 February, after establishing air superiority, Japan’s 1st Parachute
Brigade staged two drops on Palembang, Sumatra: one at the airfield and
another at the oil refinery. Though the airfield was taken quickly, fierce
fighting continued near the refinery for over a day until Japanese
airborne forces again prevailed. On 22 February about half of the Yokosuka
Force was used to capture the Dutch-held airport at Penfoei, about 20
miles east of Kupang on the island of Timor. The following day the balance
of this reinforced battalion jumped into the same location, subsequently
moved toward Kupang and captured many Dutch and Australian prisoners. In
all three instances a smaller force of airborne troopers surprised and
defeated a much larger force of defenders—a hallmark of successful
airborne operations. The Japanese military, however, did not realize the potential
of airborne warfare until it was too late in the war for the required training and
buildup to occur.
1942, 27-28 February:
A company of 119
paratroops of the British 1 Airborne Division dropped from Whitley bombers
in a commando-style raid on the German radar station at Bruneval, France
(near Le Havre). Led by then-Major John D. Frost, the paratroopers
successfully captured, disassembled, and transported the radar set down
300-ft. cliffs to the beach—under fire—and signaled waiting naval
vessels to come in and make the pick up. The radar set was taken to
England and studied by technicians.
1942, 7-8 November:
In the first U.S.
airborne operation of the war, the 60th Troop Carrier Group of the 51st
Wing flew 39 C-47s non-stop in a night flight from England to points near
Oran, carrying the 2d Battalion of the 503d Parachute Infantry (soon
redesignated the 509th Parachute Infantry Bn), whose task it was to
capture key airfields in advance of the amphibious Allied invasion force.
Confusion regarding the intentions of the French forces in the region
quickly compounded problems associated with poor planning, failed
communications, excessive distances, and inadequate training.
Soon, however, a number of small, improvised airborne operations were
developed for key points, mostly airfields, across Algeria and eastward in the race for Tunis. These operations were conducted by the
60th, 62d, and 64th Groups of the 51st Wing, commanded by then-Col. Paul
L. Williams. Airborne troopers for these operations included the 509th and
the British 1 Parachute Brigade (comprising a total of three
battalions), which began arriving in Algeria on 11 November, transported
by the 62d and 64th Groups. (See
Into The Valley, Chapter 1, for further information on
Airborne-Troop Carrier operations in North Africa.)
1943, 9-14 July: The invasion of
Sicily. First large-scale Allied airborne assault of the war, flown by
groups of the 51st Troop Carrier Wing, the newly-arrived 52d Troop Carrier
Wing, and approximately three dozen pilots of the RAF 38 Wing (later 38
Group). The first airborne units to be delivered—505th PIR and one
battalion of the 504th PIR in the American sector, and the British 1
Airlanding Brigade in the British sector—served as the spearhead of the
Allied invasion force. In later missions the balance of the 504th PIR was
brought in along with the 376th Parachute Artillery Bn and other units
comprising over 40 percent of the 82d Airborne Division in its first
combat of the war. Also delivered in the latter time frame were troopers
of the British 1 Parachute Brigade and attached units. All British units
were part of the British 1 Airborne Division. Though Sicily was viewed
officially as “a qualified success,” the problems that arose focused
attention on critical deficiencies in the Airborne-Troop Carrier program.
Poor coordination of unit headquarters, imprudent planning, especially on
the glider tow to the British sector on D-Day, inexperienced air crews
without proper training in night navigation and formation flying, and
trigger-happy Allied naval and army gunners who shot down more than two
dozen American Troop Carrier aircraft on these missions (23 on HUSKY II,
and 2 on FUSTIAN) combined to place the entire Airborne-Troop Carrier
program in jeopardy of being cut back or even cancelled. However, the proponents of the program prevailed (see
Nadzab, below). From
the Sicilian operations and from the Airborne-Troop Carrier emergency reinforcement
drops on the beaches of Salerno, Italy on 13 September came the commitment to more
thorough training in the current Stateside Troop Carrier buildup, and the creation of the Pathfinder
School in the ETO. (See Into The Valley,
Chapter 2 and 3, for more information on the Sicily and Italy missions.)
1943, 5
September: First American airborne
operation in the Pacific took place at Nadzab, New Guinea. The American
503d PIR dropped from 85 C-47s of the 374th and 375th Troop Carrier
Groups, 54th TC Wing, in a mission
to secure the airfield at Nadzab and prepare it for airlanding the
Australian 7th Division, which was to then push toward Lae from the west and
link up with Allied amphibious invasion forces moving in from the east.
The same aircraft that carried in the 503d and some Australian
artillerymen who were hastily trained as parachutists, also airlifted 420
planeloads of infantry soldiers by 11 September. The paradrop, which took
place in daylight as General MacArthur circled above in a B-17 observation
plane, was well coordinated, accurate, and effective. Along with several
key Troop Carrier maneuvers in the States during the summer and late fall,
strong support by General Ridgway, and in conjunction with the
soon-to-follow emergency missions at the Salerno beachhead, this mission
contributed to a renewed commitment to Airborne-Troop carrier by American
military leaders.
1943, 9 September-15 November:
Battalion-size German airborne assaults on
three locations ranging from Italian
Supreme HQ northeast of Rome (9 September), to attacks coordinated with
amphibious assault forces on the Greek island of Leros (12 November) and the
Italian island of Elba (15 November). All were successful. The German airborne
assault during this time frame that captured the most attention, however,
was the small but daring raid to rescue recently-deposed Italian dictator
Benito Mussolini, then under guard by the Pietro Badoglio regime, which
had moved Mussolini to a remote retreat in the Gran Sasso d’Italia
mountains. Hitler picked Otto Skorzeny to lead the raid, which was to be
carried out by a force of fewer than 50 troopers who would be landed on a small,
rocky slope in six gliders. Five more gliders and their
troops landed below and captured the hand-pulled cable car station. The
mission successfully surprised the small force of guards at the resort and Mussolini was flown out after a hair-raising take-off down the slope
by a small Storch observation aircraft.
1943, 24-25 September:
Last Soviet
operational-level airborne assault of the war. After the successful
strategic defensive operation at Kursk in July 1943, the Soviet military
quickly launched two counterattacks on German forces, which began a
retreat westward toward the Dnepr River. In an effort to expedite Soviet
crossings and develop bridgeheads, approximately 10,000 paratroops were to
be brought in from the 1st, 3d, and 5th Guards Airborne Brigades (many
troopers of which were veterans of the assault missions near Vyaz’ma in
early 1942). Aircraft used included 50 PS-84s and 150 IL-4s (B-25s
supplied by the U.S.), plus a handful of gliders and nearly three dozen
sailplane-type gliders. Parachutists were to drop at night in the area
near the pocket on the west side of the bend in the Dnepr River just below
Pereyaslav, where partisans had maintained strongpoints. Jumpers, who
included a number of nurses trained as parachutists, were delayed a day
because of weather. Units encountered problems with aircraft unsuited for
parachute delivery and in preparations and aircraft fueling. Finally,
rather than attempting to form up, aircraft simply departed as they were
ready, shuttling in troopers in widely dispersed columns. The 5th Brigade
dropped in easy range of the German 19th Panzer Division that was moving
east on the road through Dudari toward the river to provide assistance to
German forces trapped there. Most parachutists were slaughtered in the air
or as they reached the ground. Similar losses for related reasons occurred
with 3d Brigade. The 1st Brigade landed in better position and went into
action with infantry units, as planned. However, during October and
November the forces in this area at the bend of the Dnepr River were driven out
or eliminated. Ironically, the Germans poured in so many reserves to this
contested area south of Pereyaslav that Soviet forces probably crossed the
Dnepr more readily at points north and south than they would have
otherwise. Losses were so heavy and results so meager, however, that the
Soviet military confined its elite airborne units to infantry fighting for
the balance of the war. Most of the difficulties in this operation arose from a combination
of factors including expediency in planning, poor coordination, the use of
transport aircrews rather than troop carrier aircrews, no joint training
between airborne and air crews, ineffective intelligence, and improper
equipment.
|